Confessions of an Economic Hit Man

Ruthless
What is worse. . . killing a person
are depriving them of all their wealth
and basically enslaving them

Rocket River
"there are 4 ways to Conquer a world
Economically, Militarily, Philosophical, and Religion" - Omen River

 

A majority of IMF (International Monetary Fund) loans never even get paid back.

The US benefits from the growth in economies because it creates more consumers to buy from the US and feed its economy to create the high standard of living we have here today.

The US derives more from a growing Mexican economy than a bankrupted government.

The US does a lot of good in the world and though it does questionable things at times, the overall good far outweighs the bad.

 

Sure, building highways, and schools, and water treatment plants, and power plants....is a terrible thing .

Globalization is so evil.

 

I just listened to a talk by Mr Stigliz Yesterday. You won' t believe what he says about US controled globalization.

 

Stiglitz as many of you may know, was a member of the Council of Economic Advisors from 1993-95, during the Clinton administration, and served as CEA chairman from 1995-97. He then became Chief Economist and Senior Vice-President of the World Bank from 1997-2000. He won Nobel Prize in economics in 2001.

So given his past official capacity, I was very suprised he was so critical of the US policy. His main points in the talk:
* The globalization to date was largely controled by the US agenda, and promoted US interests.
* globalization met so many opposition because the policies was not friendly to development, or the vast poor of the developing world. It may benefited some upper class in those countries, but the average wage in the poorest countries didn't increase.
* Trade agreements in the last round of trade talk were not leveled. it suit US interests. It hurts poor countries more than help them, especially, US agreculture subsidy and its hyporicitic trade policy.
* Of couse, the US didn't forsee China would overtake the role of world's manufacture, the last round of talks end up helping China. Now US is pushing for the service in the new round of talks. But the proposed policies are still not fair to developing countries. US would not put services that's comparative adventage to Developing countries, and want to focus on financial services. But it's getting better, since many of the countries are now democracies and the talks are getting more transparent.
* Stiglitz has many stories of how US officials pushed their agenda and how officials in the developing countries just took it, in bilateral talks. For example, the US wants to show good will to Morocco in signing a trade treaty, but they still screwed them.
* The Dollar's reserve currency and debt currency status gives many benefits to the US. The world, and including developing world shared large amount of risks for the US. And the US government at times had polices that hurt delevoping world and benefit itself.
* He was critical of IMF and WB also.

these are the things I can remeber at the top of my head.

 

Interesting, since in his book he said: "opening up to international trade has helped many countries grow far more quickly than they would otherwise have done. ... Because of globalization many people in the world live longer than before and their standard of living is far better." ... "People in the West may regard low-paying jobs at Nike as exploitation (but) working in a factory is a far better option for many than growing rice." (Globalization) "has reduced the sense of isolation felt in much of the developing world and has given many people in the developing world access to knowledge well beyond the reach of even the wealthiest in any country a century ago."

Lest we think the IMF et al are the monoliths portrayed by Glynch et al, here is an interesting transcript from Thomas Dawson (a Director at the IMF) at a speech to the MIT Club of Washington (its long but responds specifically on point):

5. One of the many things that he criticizes us for is dispensing policy advice without taking on board the lessons of the academic work that won him the Nobel. Stiglitz evidently feels that being a top-notch academic economist is ample qualification for being a good policymaker. The fact is that Joe got a late start in policymaking and shows it. Policymaking requires a different skill set from academic theorizing. Joe's skills as a policymaker are vastly improved by hindsight, something his former boss Jim Wolfensohn alluded to when he said about Joe: "To stand back later and say, "If you'd done it my way everything would have been different," is a little generous to yourself."

6. Stiglitz has recently written a book called "Globalization and its Discontents". Despite its general title, the book is mostly about the IMF, not a major critique of globalization. The Economist, said in its review that a more accurate title for the book would have been "The IMF and My Discontent."

7. My bean-counting assistant noted that the index to the book has some 64 references to globalization, whereas references to the IMF-almost all critical-total 340. That works out to over one alleged mistake committed by the IMF per page. You'd think by sheer accident we'd have gotten a couple of things right.

8. That's my bottom-line message: You can't judge a book by its cover. There are two books in here:

the first is a haphazard list of allegations against the IMF. Buried amidst the half-truths and some nasty (and false) allegations are a few valid criticisms of the IMF. Stiglitz tries to provide a grand theme for all this by claiming that all these mistakes are due to the IMF's slavish devotion to what he calls "market fundamentalism". He is simply wrong in this view. I won't have time to delve too much into specific allegations here but I will tell you why the overall criticism is wrong.

the second book, matching the advertised title of "Globalization and its Discontents", is a discussion of the benefits and risks of globalization. Stiglitz's views here are quite mainstream and the IMF and many other observers would be in substantial agreement with him.

9. Let me begin with Stiglitz's overarching critique of the IMF, that it is driven by "market fundamentalism". Stiglitz accuses the IMF of being driven by a belief in the perfection of markets and the imperfection of governments. The accusation is simply wrong. IMF staff are well aware that they owe their jobs to the imperfections of markets.

10. What is probably true is that the staff of the IMF (and the World Bank) have over time become more confident about the ability to use markets to serve the public interest. What caused this shift? Quite simply, the evidence. Through the 1980s, central planning represented an important alternative to markets as a way of organizing economies. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the fall of the Berlin Wall suggested to many that markets, whatever their faults, were a more durable way of organizing a country's economy. This feeling was reinforced by the good economic performance of the United States and the United Kingdom, both of which had moved to more market-oriented systems during the 1980s.

11. While these monumental changes were going on in the world economy, Stiglitz was hard at work in academia illuminating in a remarkable series of papers the flaws of market economies. As the award of the Nobel Prize attests, those papers are surely important contributions. But it cannot come as a surprise that, given the sweeping historical developments that I have described, the practical lessons being applied in the policymaking realm involved making more, rather than less, use of markets to solve economic problems.

12. The great British economist John Maynard Keynes, who Stiglitz greatly admires, once said in replying to a critic: "When I get new information, I change my opinions. What, sir, do you do with new information?" One is tempted to ask Joe Stiglitz why, despite the new information about the fall of central planning, there has not been a transition in his views about the relative prevalence of market and government failure.

13. Other eminent economists have made the transition. Larry Summers, former U.S. Treasury Secretary and currently President of an university in Cambridge whose name escapes me, is one example. He said, in an interview, that when he was growing up Milton Friedman was the devil incarnate in his household. But now, Summers said, he has ungrudging respect for Friedman's views about the market.

14. The IMF's critics on the right find the allegation that the IMF is driven by market fundamentalism completely ludicrous. For instance, listen to what Brink Lindsey of the Cato Institute, the true home of market fundamentalism, says in his review of the book in the Wall Street Journal. Lindsey writes that for Stiglitz to accuse the IMF of market fundamentalism "is misleading to the point of absurdity ...There's nothing in his book that suggests even a whisper of the many profound disagreements between the "disciples of Milton Friedman," as he calls them, and the IMF's economists. Such disagreements do not fit well with Mr. Stiglitz's ax-grinding, and so, apparently, he decided to leave them out."

15. Not only is the overarching criticism incorrect, notes Lindsey, but the examples that Stiglitz provides of how market fundamentalism led the IMF astray are vastly over-blown. According to Stiglitz, Russia's difficult transition from communism, worsening poverty in Africa, the collapse of Argentina's economy--these all are manifestations of what happens when the IMF's market fundamentalists get their way. The fact is that there are all very complex situations on which there was, and remains to this day, plenty of disagreement about the right way to do things and who is to blame for things that have gone wrong. The IMF deserves its share of the blame, but so do many others.

16. In fact, many of Stiglitz's criticisms should apply with equal force to our sister institution, the World Bank. Issues related to privatization, the quality of a country's institutions, consideration of alternate strategies to alleviate poverty-these are all areas where our sister institution tends to be what's called the "lead agency". But, as the New York Times noted in its review, the Bank "is spared the searing indictment that Professor Stiglitz reserves for the IMF ... Not surprisingly, part of the book's purpose seems to be an attempt to ensure that events during his World Bank tenure do not besmirch his own reputation. In the process, one suspects that some score-settling may well be in play."

17. As part of this score-settling, Stiglitz has made some very mean-spirited observations about Fund staff and officials, past and present. One charge in particular should not go unanswered, particularly before this audience. Stiglitz notes that Stanley Fischer, the former deputy head of the IMF and former MIT professor of economics, went straight from the IMF to Citigroup. Stiglitz adds: "A chairman of Citigroup was Robert Rubin who, as secretary of Treasury, had a central role in IMF policies. One could only ask, Was Fischer being richly rewarded for having faithfully executed what he was told to do?" To anyone who knows Fischer's utter devotion to institutions he works for, whether it was the IMF or MIT, the suggestion that he used twisted IMF policies to ensure a job at Citicorp is repugnant. Stiglitz surely knows that Fischer is regarded as a man of unimpeachable integrity and yet he cannot resist the jibe at him.

18. I also take strong exception to the portrayal of IMF staff as uncaring bureaucrats serving the narrow interests of the Western financial community. Stiglitz implies that IMF staff see the unemployed "as just a statistic ... the unintended casualties in the fight against inflation or to ensure that Western banks get repaid." He suggests that IMF staff, like the pilots of "modern high-tech warfare" who drop "bombs from 50000 feet", have no feelings for the people whose lives are affected by their policies. The IMF's staff are drawn from nearly a 150 countries; many are acutely aware of the pain and suffering of the people of developing countries and want the situation in these countries to get better. Stiglitz has not cornered the market on morality and caring. Another Stiglitz refrain is that IMF staff "make themselves comfortable in five-star hotels" in the countries they visit for missions. If, as Stiglitz recommends in his book, the IMF and the World Bank become subject to some sort of a Freedom of Information Act, many IMF staff will rush to ask for the release of Stiglitz's own travel and hotel records during his years as a World Bank staffer: Given the shrillness of his complaints about others staying in five-star hotels, we fully expect to find that Stiglitz has been leading by example and staying in places several notches lower.

19. Stiglitz has also attacked the competence of IMF staff, once characterizing them as "third-rank students from first-rate universities." This provoked Rudi Dornbusch, a famous MIT professor of international economics, into responding that "at Harvard and MIT, and everywhere else, fresh Ph.Ds who can't get jobs at the top 5 universities in the world will pick the World Bank or the IMF. And that is all for the better. Anyone likely to be picked as top draft choice by the top schools may be a trifle too theoretical for the cruder world of policymaking. Stiglitz himself with his predilection for the intriguing exceptions rather than the general rule is a great case in point."

20. OK, enough of the food-fight. Let me shift to a more positive tone and acknowledge the validity of some of the criticisms Stiglitz makes of the IMF. As I noted earlier, the IMF's has two main tasks: first, to help preserve global financial stability and, second, to assist the World Bank and others in the global war on poverty. The critiques by Stiglitz (and others) on some of our failures on both of these fronts, while not accurate down to every last detail, are well-taken.

21. One criticism is that the U.S. Treasury and the IMF showed excessive zeal in encouraging countries to open up to short-term foreign capital in the mid-1990s. The critics say that the entry, and often the subsequent hasty exodus, of foreign capital into economies which are too small or whose financial sectors are ill-equipped to regulate and absorb the capital can be devastating. Is this a valid characterization? It's useful to recall a bit of history first. When the IMF was created in 1944, its founders envisioned a world with free trade but with restrictions on movement of capital across countries. In the jargon, current accounts were to be open, but capital accounts closed. There is no denying that the vision of the world being promoted by the IMF in the mid-1990s was different: at the 1997 IMF-World Bank meetings the proposal on the table was to make eventual deregulation of international capital flows obligatory for IMF members. In the case of Korea, the U.S. Treasury did press (albeit with lack of success) for broad capital account liberalization in the context of the country's OECD accession.

22. But while Stiglitz's characterization of a greater push toward capital account liberalization is broadly correct, it is inaccurate in many important details. The IMF and the U.S. Treasury did not encourage countries to liberalize short-term flows through the banking sector, which is what turned out to be the Achilles Heel during the Asian crisis. And many countries liberalize for their own reasons rather than as a consequence of external prodding-Thailand for instance was keen to have Bangkok emerge as international financial sector like Singapore. Nevertheless, as a result of the criticism by Stiglitz and others, the IMF is more vocal in pointing out the risks of rapid capital account liberalization. While such cautionary notes have always been present in IMF advice on capital account liberalization, today they are much more likely to be given greater prominence. For instance, three weeks ago, although unnoticed by anyone in the international media but the Dow Jones newswires, we advised Sri Lanka against opening up its capital account until its financial sector was further strengthened.

23. Other aspects of our handling of the financial crisis in Asia have also come for criticism from Stiglitz and others. We've acknowledged that we made mistakes in our initial response to the crisis. As anyone who has been centrally involved in crisis situations will tell you, battlefield medicine is never perfect. We were surprised by the speed and virulence with which the crisis spread to many countries in the region. The experience revealed the IMF had not kept up with the rapid developments in international capital markets, a deficiency it has tried to rectify through a number of steps taken over the last couple of years.

24. Our most glaring error, according to many observers, was to recommend excessive belt-tightening to Thailand at the start of the crisis. It is worth recalling that in July 1997, Thailand was still growing rapidly, had a huge and growing current account deficit (more than 8 percent of GDP), and faced large, though as yet unrecognized, fiscal liabilities to recapitalize the financial system. It was against this background that the Imf recommended a roughly-unchanged fiscal position. However, once the scope of the crisis became evident, we quickly changed course. Indeed, IMF-supported programs in Thailand and other crisis countries were soon marked by large budget deficits, in part because of increases in spending on social safety net programs. This is exactly the kind of easing of fiscal policy Stiglitz advocates.

25. There is another, more technical, debate about which there is still no meeting of the minds between Stiglitz and others. This debate has to do with the appropriateness of the IMF's advice on monetary policy during the Asian crisis. The IMF and many others continue to disagree with Stiglitz's assertion that it is obvious that monetary policy must also be eased at the onset of a financial crisis. As Larry Summers noted recently, "when a country's exchange rate is declining rapidly because capital is trying to leave the country, and the country's financial institutions are in real trouble, there is a fundamental conflict between restoring external confidence by raising interest rates and providing for financial repair through increased liquidity. It's a classic problem of a single instrument and multiple targets. Confidence is widely recognized as essential in combating financial crises." Others have taken similar positions. Dornbusch for instance says that "investors will take confidence and bring money back when they see fiscal conservatism and high interest rates. Do that for a few months and you are on the right track." Our former chief economist Michael Mussa said in his typically colorful language that those who advocate easing monetary policy at the onset of a financial crisis are smoking something "not entirely legal". So the point is that there isn't a professional consensus on this topic. What's needed is honest debate and a closer look at the evidence, not polemics.

26. The experience of more recent financial crises, such as the one in Argentina, suggest that our existing mechanisms to resolve crises in a rapid and orderly fashion do not work smoothly. One problem is that governments do not deal with their sovereign debt problems promptly; the situation is often allowed to fester until a crisis is precipitated. Our current deputy head Anne Krueger has suggested creating a statutory mechanism to secure a more orderly and timely restructuring of unsustainable sovereign debts. For those of you who may have been following this issue, the mechanism being proposed is to empower a super-majority of creditors to take key decisions in the restructuring process in negotiation with the debtor. Stiglitz has been quite supportive of the general idea of having a sovereign debt restructuring mechanism.

27. With respect to our other main task, poverty alleviation, Stiglitz notes that the IMF and the World Bank have recently launched a new approach. This is a more "participatory" approach, one which involves the country's government and its civil society at an early stage in measuring the size of the poverty problem and in devising development strategies to reduce poverty. We get a rare compliment here when Stiglitz says that even though participatory assessments are not yet being perfectly implemented "they are a step in the right direction". He also notes correctly that if the gap between the rhetoric and reality of the new poverty strategy "persists for too long or remains too great, there will be a sense of disillusionment."

 

The problem I see with blaming the US for lack of true globalization is that other countries do it far worse than
the US.

The General Electric/Honeywell merger was not allowed by the EU and many speculated b/c it would hurt competitors in Europe such as Rolls Royce (Jet Engines)

Take Japan for example, Kodak tried for YEARS to get into the market with no avail. They tried their best to protect FujiFilm and even after it was allowed, the market share had already been created and it was too difficult for Kodak to get in.

Every single country does whats in its best interest. The US is just like the Titanic versus a bunch of tug boats. If they were in our position they would do the same.

 

Wow, I'm impressed. In stead of debating, or refuting his points, you digged out some beaucrat's (I've never heard of that guy) defense against Stiglitz's charges, and try to discredit him.

This thread isn't about IMF, this is about how US controled most of the agenda in globalization so far. You can't honestly say US doesn't get better end of the deal in those trade talks. And yes, lending procyclically to developing economies, encourage their excessive borrowing so that US companies can earn more contracts isn't a pro-development policy. You just need to look at Latin America. And it's not Japan or even Sk we are talking about here. We are talking about the poorest countries, who definately don't get favorable terms of trade in current international settings.

I don't want to get too technical here. I will say this, the developing countries, and especially their officials are at least equal to blame for screwing themselves up in the globalization.

In a recent WTO case against the US which Brazil brought, one of Brazil's top expert consultant is a professor at SF state U. Brazil wins the case, rightfully - for now. Some people are calling that prof traitors and urges SF State to fire him. The U resisted the pressure, for now. But story like that makes me really sad.

 

what does the us really make anymore that the masses of mexicans or any third world country care to buy? even the middle class? american cars? no. american tvs? no. american computers? not for long.

 

My personal favourite..

"And those corporations build in this third-world country large power plants, highways, ports, or industrial parks – big infrastructure projects that basically serve the very rich. ..."

That is one of the more absurd statements I have heard of late.

 

Hmmm, the post directly refutes Stiglitz's charges so what are you talking about? In addition it provides some insight into the mindset of those involved in the same institutions Stiglitz was involved with. Dawson goes out of his way to acknowledge Stiglitz's academic work and his Nobel Prize - so that's hardly character assassination, lol.

Since the IMF and WB are the core actors in international debt issues and development policies, I'm not sure how you conclude they are irrelevant to this discussion. Further you point out that he was an officer of the WB to bolster his credibility, so what those actors actually DO would seem to be relevant.

Why would I? As Khan points out, that's what every country does. What should we do, encourage policies that are detrimental to us?

Well, first your position is not the same as Stiglitz's. He charges among other things that we are driving out indigenous cultures, which is an anti-development argument. If you want to talk about the problems with structural adjustment and the austerity measures that come with it, they are being addressed by the IMF and WB with specific programs designed to ameliorate the belt tightening - like the microloan programs.

Take Glynchs example, where social services are cut back to service the debt. That ignores the fact that there wouldn't be social services to begin with without the investment. No one will invest in a developing country without guarantees on return. Why would they?

Its also important to keep in mind that these policies are what keep your international funds afloat. I sure hope you and glynch don't own any, because without these measures to keep the budget in line in places like LA, there wouldn't BE any investment flow.

Last, isn't it weird how one week we're getting crushed by the EU and China, and the next we're controlling the world's economies and making all the money?

 

hmmm. I don't see Dowson's points directly refute my list of Stiglitz's points. In stead, it is about IMF, especially the crisis handlement. Dowson is an IMF dicrector after all.

Maybe you have Stiglitz's book in mind, or maybe you think IMF is a branch of the US government, I don't know.

Yeah, how wonderful that he "goes out of his way to acknowledge Stiglitz's academic work and his Nobel Prize". People in FUND are either economists or bureaucrats, everyone knows, his point is "but that doesn't make you a fine policy maker".

NO, IMF is not core actor in international debt issues. But that's beyond the point. Unless again, you see IMF as an extention of US policy (not too far off though).

People do invest without gurantee in return. It's called risk, its the name of investment. But again, it hardly have to do with the thread. Believe it or not, there are plenty of projects out there in developing world that doesn't need big US corporations yet can yield healthy returns. International funds you say? current US policy doesn't gurantee my return on those either. It takes 10 years for Mexico index to return to 1994 level in Dollar turns.

I don't think US is crashed by EU or China. I think the globalization agenda is still dominated by the US.

Why would I? As Khan points out, that's what every country does. What should we do, encourage policies that are detrimental to us?
At the end of the day. You do agree with the main point. Only that you say everyone's doing it. Frankly, since US is such an dominant force in those international economic institutions, if the US lead and seek a fairer playgorund for international trade, most would have to follow. As of now, Japan, EU and even China would rush to protect their own pie, and get some. The poorer ones without bargining power get the shorter end.

I'm not blaming US for looking out its own interest, or even giving the shorter end to others in these multilateral economic talks. The problem I see is, that can not go on for too long. It will create a sense of disillusion of the globalization among poorer countries. The new agreements would be harder to come by (as Doha round indicates). It would not be good for the US also in the long run.

 

I said it refutes Stiglitz's points, not your list - but as your list includes among other things - that he was critical in general of the IMF and WB, yes - it does refute those as well.

Yes, part of the response is about his book, but also his public criticisms aside from the book (or rather in support of the book). And yes, the IMF and WB are essentially US foreign policy tools.

Well included is a specific critique from other international economists about Stiglitz and his methodology as it applies to policymaking. Rather than address it you're just sloughing off.

??? That's interesting - one of their primary missions is to make loans to countries that cannot service their debt. From IMF's site

A core responsibility of the IMF is to provide loans to countries experiencing balance-of-payments problems. This financial assistance enables countries to rebuild their international reserves, stabilize their currencies, continue paying for imports, and restore conditions for strong economic growth. Unlike development banks, the IMF does not lend for specific
projects.

If you didn't have the IMF and WB stabilizing these developing economies when their own governments screw them up, you wouldn't see investment in those countries at anywhere near the same levels, if at all. Capital would flee because of the lack of stability. The criticisms of structural adjustment mainly center around the austerity measures that are enforced to bring government spending in line so debt payments can be serviced. If you let governments spend whatever and default on their debt, who would then lend them money for development? No one.

Is US leading globalization? Sure, with most of the other major powers out there all falling in line. Do we pursue trade agreements that are in our favor? I think you exaggerate on this, as does Stiglitz. Seems to me we've got a huge deficit in goods, and services - which stiglitz criticizes us for - are one of the main things we CAN export since we're not really a manufacturing power anymore. It wouldn't be good for the US in the long run to create agreements that our disadvantageous for ourselves either. So as the lesser developed countries get more stable and integrated, yes they will want better deals. Good for them. They will also have strengthen institutions that make their economies more transparent, and will also have to bring down barriers to our good/services, which is good for us long term.

 

IMF is for BOP loans to sovereign countries, international debt market mostly refers to syndicated loans from big US and other international banks, or US or global bond issues by firms/governments of the said countries, hence IMF is not a core actor in debt market. It plays a role, sort of cental bank/lender of last resort, but not active role.

In fact, although IMF provides some stability, its contribution in regard to the original topic in this thread is debatible. It provide implicit gurantee to international (US) lenders, it encourage the lavish/excessive borrowing in the developing countries that original article was critical of. Maybe without IMF, big banks would think twice when encouraging the countries to take on debt, would have to shoulder more risk in lending out money. Now IMF protects private lenders from risk, gives out austere conditions when time comes bad, and shift the risk totally onto the developing countries--with mostly US tax money. So you point actually doesn't refute this thread's original argument. I'm glad you actually admit IMF as a tool of the US policy.

Some points in the books, may be exaggerate, like most book writers do. But when the white house spends todays in session fighting for some specialty corn subsidy that protect some one hundred household in the US, in the mean time some thousands of very poor man suffers more because of this policy, it makes one think weather its worth it. The hours (thus wage) waisted in debating, manuvuring could have covered those households.

Anyway, pardon me if I don't respond point by point any more. I believe our view are actually not that different. Maybe just different perspective.

 

Interesting article. I've heard of corporatism as corporate facism. The way our democracies are worked, I'm not sure whether any partisan power has a direct influence to change this. The reason being that NGOs aren't democratically representative. Who is the US's delegate to the WTO? IMF? It might matter to steel manufacturers and farmers, but they or I didn't get a vote on who gets the position. It's not only this country, but the same applies to every other democratic country. No representation.

We've seen what 8 years of Clinton did to globablization.... nothing but increased involvement. So really none of the 2 major parties is against globablization. In pure capitalistic theory, globalization benefits the world. In reality, we've witnessed the emergence of these ungodly sized corporations that are merging and using synergies to horizontally merge with other corporations. As a result, the board of directors are dwindling. Only a few companies will remain and those board of directors will be the last ones standing. We didn't vote for those people either. Companies definitely are not representive in the glass ceiling.

So what we have left is our great democratic boundaries in the name of nationalism. Well corporations are borderless yet wield the power of minor nations. How much of a democracy do we have in place to wrest the control of these corporate interests? It's still possible with the system we have now, but public spirit is unwilling, unknowing or uncaring. That is the biggest coup of our leaders have pulled.

source from Craig B Hulet