[In-Depth] Analyzing the 2012 NBA Draft: Piecing Together Morey’s Draft Board

Warning: this is a long one. All original content. I thank justtxyank for his wonderful recap of Morey's post-draft interview on 790, which I have used extensively for this thread. If you don't want to read 3,000 words that should be worth your time, you can scroll down and read the bolded parts.

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Analyzing the 2012 NBA Draft: Piecing Together Morey’s Draft Board

The 2012 NBA Draft came and went. Relative to the lofty expectations that had been built up prior to the draft, it’s been a highly disappointing and frustrating day for Rocket fans. The Rockets did not manage to move into the top 10, and the much-anticipated Godfather offer to Orlando never came into fruition. Instead, we ended up using all three picks, and true to Morey’s philosophy of always picking the best player available, we ended up once again stacking the positions we have the most depth at – the wings spots and power forward.

I was especially displeased because not only was I disappointed about the lack of a trade, I did not agree with all of Morey’s selections, in particular the 18th pick for Terrence Jones. (FYI, I was pulling for Kendall Marshall, Tyler Zeller, and Jared Sullinger.) However, given Morey’s previous stellar drafting record, I’m not going to argue with those selections at this point. I will assume that they are, indeed, the best players (according to Morey’s metrics) available at their draft positions.

Many posters on the forum have already voiced their displeasure regarding the gut at power forward, the (continued) lack of direction, and general frustration regarding the lack of a major move. I will not repeat what’s already been said a million times. Instead, in light of the new evidence we have (Morey’s post draft media video, his interview on 790, Feigen’s post draft chat, among others), I want to try to piece together Morey’s 2012 draft board and analyze how the draft probably went down. Given Morey’s long stance of always drafting BPA, I believe that an accurate portrayal of the Rocket’s Big Board sheds a lot of light towards their thinking during draft night.

I have more thoughts about the glut at power forward and player development that will probably be suited for another thread. Regardless of what the result was, the 2012 NBA Draft has already happened. Eventually, I want to look past the draft and explore the possible options that the team has going forward.


I. Morey’s Big Board

1. Anthony Davis – is there even a question?
2. Michael Kidd-Gilchrist
3. Bradley Beal
4. Thomas Robinson

Contrary to the idea that if we moved into the 5th spot, it appears that Morey’s choice would not have easily been Andre Drummond. Instead, the 2-4 spots on his draft board were the “consensus” candidates, which we know to be MKG, Robinson, and Beal. The only evidence I have for ordering those three is based on Feigen’s comment that Morey apparently likes MKG more than usual. Therefore, this implies that in the case that the top four picks played out the way they did, and that Sacramento decided to trade us the 5th pick anyway, we would probably have selected Robinson over Drummond. Very interesting.

5. Andre Drummond

Long rumored to be Morey’s top choice after moving up, we now know more about Morey’s thinking. He’s not simply going to take people because they are seven footers, and he understands the high bust risk surrounding centers. He even believes that the bust risk is higher than many fans imagine – it’s not yet clear if “70%-80%” is the bust risk that he’s assigned to Drummond, but we can conjecture that Drummond was not at all a “safe” pick.

6. Damian Lillard

We don’t know if the “top six above Lamb” Morey mentioned is the top six players that went in the draft or the top six on his board, but since Drummond is definitely above Lamb and went 9th, I will assume that there are in fact exactly six players ranked above Lamb. The 6th player on Morey’s board has to be outside of the consensus top four but taken before our pick for Lamb at 12th.

I admit that putting Lillard here is purely my conjecturing. We have seen that Morey does not like taking unnecessary risks and also values “consensus” candidates highly, so I’m going to put a relatively proven player here. The other option is Harrison Barnes. I based the selection of Lillard over Barnes on this tweet:

It’s also possible that we would have taken Lillard at 5, just to trade down to the Blazers for more value. In this case we might not actually think that Lillard is a better prospect than Lamb, who’s next in line. Suppose that the first 4 picks played out as was widely expected: Davis at #1, Robinson at #2, Beal at #3, and MKG at #4. We would then be able to receive the 5th pick from Sacramento. In this case, I could totally see Morey take Lillard, forcing a trade with Portland for Drummond.

Somehow I highly doubt Waiters, Ross, or Leonard placed here. I feel that we would have been able to trade for Leonard if we truly wanted him this bad, and Ross seems too much of a reach.

7. Jeremy Lamb

Morey has delivered this pick. Now it has become clear that we traded up from 14th to 12th especially to get Lamb, and Phoenix was going to take him at 13th if we didn’t. Morey seems also to have explored trading up even further from 12 (to 10 and 11, presumably) to land Lamb.

8. Harrison Barnes??
9. ???
10. ???

Everything beyond here is very murky and we will probably never know. All those that could be in between Lamb and White include: Barnes, Ross, Rivers, Leonard, Waiters, Marshall, Henson, and Harkless. That’s eight in total.

Morey says he was “thrilled with board from 14th-18th,” so I can only assume that many of his top rated prospects were still on board at that point. Now we know that he seriously liked White, Zeller and Jones, in that order. These three must rank pretty high on his list.

I would think that Morey probably liked a few of these eight prospects quite a bit, especially Barnes, given his pedigree, Waiters given his eventual high draft position at #4, and Marshall, due to Morey’s past comments about how difficult it is to acquire a solid distributor in free agency and trades. However, I would guess that not many players go between Lamb and White, given the extent to which he thought the middle part of the draft retained value. I think it’s likely that on his actual draft board there were 2-3 players before White.

11. Royce White
12. ??
13. Tyler Zeller
14. Terrence Jones

It’s obvious where these three picks go. Dallas was going to take White at 17 if we didn’t, and Zeller was the one we wanted to drop to 18. With Zeller gone, Morey’s pick for Jones, who was again a ¾ tweener, screamed BPA. In between White and Zeller, and to a lesser extent between Zeller and Jones, there could be obviously be more people that had been already taken. The gap between White and Zeller should be wider comparably. Regardless, we know for a fact that all three players were ranked on Morey's board much further ahead than the spots they were drafted at.

So here's Morey's big board, from one to the early teens, that I have recreated:

1. Anthony Davis
-----
2. Michael Kidd-Gilchrist
3. Bradley Beal
4. Thomas Robinson
-----
5. Andre Drummond
6. Damian Lillard
-----
7. Jeremy Lamb
8. Harrison Barnes??
9. ??
10. ??
11. Royce White
12. ??
13. Tyler Zeller
14. Terrence Jones

The ----- I put in my recreation of the board indicates tiers. Davis is in a tier all by himself, followed by the consensus next three in MKG, Beal and Robinson. Drummond and Lillard goes in the next tier, because we only have a shot at them if we move up again from 12th – for Dummond, at least to Toronto’s 8th spot, for Lillard, Sacramento’s 5th spot.

In the end, we did have a good draft in the sense that we got the seventh best prospect on our board at 12th, and two players ranked in the very early teens at 16th and 18th, respectively. Recall that in 2010 Morey had 8 guys he wanted in the lottery (Patterson at 6th), and in 2011 he wanted 10 guys in the lottery, of which we managed to get one (Morris).


II. How the 2012 NBA Draft went down

As has been said already by various posters, three picks in the top 10 keyed this draft and the mess/confusion that followed. Here’s my pick by pick analysis of the top 10:

1. New Orleans Hornets - Anthony Davis: no surprises here.

2. Charlotte Bobcats - Michael Kidd-Gilchrist:

Charlotte was widely expected to take Robinson at this spot, but they went for MKG regardless. Let’s not talk about whether MKG is the right pick for the Bobcats (it’s amusing that they would pick another Gerald Wallace type after letting Wallace go), but rather focus on the fact that their top prospect was in fact Kidd-Gilchrist.

Still, I believe that Charlotte lost out on a lot of value here because the hottest commodity after Davis in this draft was without a doubt Bradley Beal. The Wizards’ and Cavs’ top choice was Beal by far. I don’t know how the Cavalier’s trade up plan for this pick failed (as reported by Marc Spears), but in hindsight, the Bobcats should have taken Beal here and then traded down. Worst case, they receive an 18 year-old shooting guard with serious All-star potential.

Update: This quote from Feigen sheds light on what happened on Draft Night.

It turned out that the #2 pick by Charlotte set the entire draft in motion, and was probably unexpected for many GMs around the league (including Morey). We also learn that Cleveland’s board looked something like this: 1. Davis 2. Gilchrist/Beal 3. Waiters. Gilchrist was the only one they had a legitimate shot at, if the Bobcats chose to take Robinson 2nd overall.

3. Washington Wizards - Bradley Beal:

This is the dream pick for the Wizards. No chance Washington moves Beal in a million years.

4. Cleveland Cavaliers - Dion Waiters:

Now here’s the real head scratcher. There’s no doubt that the Cavs seriously, seriously reached for Waiters here. At the very least, they could have drafted Robinson and traded him to Sacramento. The next two picks were pretty much set in stone – the Blazers wanted a point guard, and even if the Rockets were to obtain the 5th pick, they were likely going for Drummond. The next spot that Waiters could go would be 7th for the Warriors. It just doesn’t seem to make sense for Cleveland to reach this far for Waiters without getting anything else of value at all.

5. Sacramento Kings - Thomas Robinson:

The Kings get the one guy the covet in the draft, and we’re screwed.

6. Portland Trailblazers - Damian Lillard:

No surprises here, apparently the Trailblazers prefer Lillard’s potential over a sure thing (Lowry).

7. Golden State Warriors - Harrison Barnes:

The Warriors have lusted for a solid SF who can contribute right away, and they have the perfect guy fall right into their laps. No way they would move this pick when Barnes becomes available.

8. Toronto Raptors - Terrence Ross:

If you thought Waiters at 4 was a dumb move… This might be the reach of the draft right here. Trading down to the Rockets for the 12th and 16th/18th picks would have made so much more sense, it blows my mind. Unless the Raptors had sure fire intel that the Pistons would take Ross with the 9th pick if they miss out on Drummond, or that the Hornets would take Ross (very unlikely), this pick is just plain lunacy. Here was our best chance at getting our 5th most liked player, Drummond.

9. Detroit Pistons - Andre Drummond:

The world knows that the Pistons covet Drummond. No way they move him for anything we have without us doing something like taking on Villanueva or (God forbid) Tayshaun Prince’s contract.

10. New Orleans Hornets - Austin Rivers:

This is a rather normal pick for the Hornets, and was anticipated. Not much to say here.

We know that: a. Morey had a deal in place with Sacramento that involved Lowry and multiple picks for the 5th pick, as long as Robinson did not fall to 5th; and b. Morey has talked extensively with every team in the top 10 outside of New Orleans and probably had multiple back up moves if the Sacramento trade fell through, especially at 8th with Toronto.

It is clear that what went down on draft night was without doubt the worst case scenario for us in all aspects. When our deal with Sacramento (and subsequently Toronto, presumably) was shattered, we had no way to make a convincing offer to Orlando, or use that pick as a jumping board to maneuver our way within the top 10.

In the end, our gamble of accumulating mid first round picks for the big draft night trade backfired. After Drummond, all of the picks up to 18 were essentially in the same tier. Therefore, packaging picks in a trade hardly made sense. Deals for veterans don’t usually happen with picks outside of the lottery on draft night, and are usually much more difficult to coordinate (which is why they usually go down before the Draft or after free agency is settled).

People have also suggested trading picks for future picks. Regarding this aspect, Morey mentioned in the post draft news conference that they had such deals offered to them, but they felt like the talent available was too good for those types of deals. Understandable – the deals offered were probably something like Jones or White for a future heavily protected first rounder, possibly from a contending team. Since Morey believed he was getting lottery caliber for all three of these picks, it’s easy to understand why he would think that he’s giving up excess value for such trades.


III. Conclusions:

From my recreation of Morey’s draft board and analysis of draft day moves, I conclude the following points about the Rockets’ draft strategy:

1. Always draft the best player available. This draft again underscores this longstanding philosophy of the Rockets in a big way, as we see with the bazillion forwards on our roster.

2. The Rockets brass is not shy to take on big risks in terms of prospects with heavy bust potential. However, every significant risk has to be balanced by enormous reward. The pursuit of Andre Drummond demonstrates this point fully. Morey also quantifies the risk that is associated, and balances the probability of a player such as Drummond becoming a star player with the chances of landing a star through trade or free agency. Criticisms such as “the Rockets are afraid to roll the dice” are completely unfounded. The Rockets’ risk management is very solid.

3. Contrary to popular belief, Morey does not always make “safe picks.” He understands that our goal in the draft is to find players with star potential, and not role players. Therefore, “upside” is highly emphasized in his criteria of ranking players. I cannot emphasize this point enough. Morey and co. definitely have a set method of evaluating and weighing that upside against the chances of it being realized, and as I’ve mentioned, we have no reason to be skeptical of method given Morey’s draft record.

4. The Rockets will go for a star that plays any position. You would think that Morey’s target is a star center, but actually, it’s anything worth building around, or any blue chip piece that can possibly bring something that’s worth building around. This brings me to the next point:

5. The Draft, for the Rockets, is only one part of an integrated rebuilding approach. This point is probably the most important, and has several smaller elements to it.

a. The Rockets are one of the best teams in the league in terms of maximizing value out of a certain pick. They will trade down repeatedly if they can manage to secure the player want, and pick up more assets in the way. As we have seen, not all teams have that ability. Charlotte, Cleveland and Toronto shine as bad examples here – this is an indication of poor management skills and explains partially the states that those franchises are in.

b. Every pick is the Rockets’ own pick, and no pick is the Rockets’ own pick. Morey and co. realize that the rebuilding effort will take multiple star players, and likely will not be resolved in a single draft. There’s a lot of value in acquiring “consensus picks” since not only are those players usually very good, they also have extremely high trade value and can be used to flip for a star player in trades (e.g. Derrick Favors). So even if Morey drafts a highly touted prospect, don’t get too attached.

c. The draft demonstrates again that the current management has a long-term vision to the rebuilding effort. The approach that we have taken is designed for contention in the long term rather than short-term results.

Ultimately, I agree with management’s approach, and as I stated in a previous thread, you have to go with the right approach and live with the results, no matter what they may be.

However, no strategy is foolproof. While some posters are enthusiastic about having a roster chock full of rookies (with additions from last night, we will have 7 players from the past two drafts on the roster), I am decidedly less happy about this result, and I suspect that Morey is not as pleased as he claimed to be in his post draft interview, either. Too many young players do not necessarily hinder each other’s “development” per se, but definitely can negatively affect their trade value. The more medium value young players you have on a roster, the marginal cost of developing the player goes up and the marginal utility of their development goes down, since it is difficult to reflect that development in terms of trade value. However, this is all for another thread to discuss.
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Bibliography:

1. Daryl Morey post-draft news conference thread: http://bbs.clutchfans.net/showthread.php?t=222003

2. Morey's post-draft interview on 790, with justtxyank's amazing recap: http://bbs.clutchfans.net/showthread.php?t=222028

3. Feigen's post-draft chat: http://blog.chron.com/ultimaterockets/2012/06/replay-jonathan-feigens-post-nba-draft-chat/

4. The Ken Berger tweet I used: http://twitter.com/KBergCBS/status/218116896086700033

 

Are you asking how I know Robinson wasn't #2 on Morey's board, or are you asking how Morey would know if Robinson would go #2? If it's the former, the evidence I used was the Feigen quote I pulled. If you're asking the latter, I have no answer.

 

Oh now I see what you mean. True. As I said, my rankings from 2-4 were pure conjecture. I have no way of knowing which one Morey preferred over the others.

 

Source? Sorry haven't heard that before.

 

Great points that I missed. However, there are inconsistencies between the quotes. If you look at the ones I used, both Feigen and Morey have indicated that there is a "consensus top four," and it doesn't seem that Drummond would be included in that group, because Drummond would almost surely be available at 5. The key thing is to clear up who these four players were, and it seems to me that they should have been Davis, Robinson, Beal, and Kidd-Gilchrist. We know we wanted to move up for Drummond, so Drummond seems to be in front of Lamb - unless it's the opposite and we never wanted to offer the 12th in a deal to get Drummond? That could make sense too.

 

1. The current rebuilding period under Morey only started after Yao Ming went down for good two seasons ago. Obviously the situation changed multiple times in the past 15 years, but you don't need me to remind you that we once had players named Tracy McGrady and Yao Ming on this roster.

2. Alexander and Morey have talked about a rebuilding phase for 3-5 years, and I think that's a fair estimate. I think the rebuilding really started from last season, when we finally took off all of the dead weight contracts and could have a free hand to maneuver.

3. Other alternatives? You are apparently on the tanking boat, tell me how long it would take to find franchise cornerstones through the draft? Unless you can guarantee us three number one picks in a row, this path can also easily take 3-5 years. Just ask the Bobcats, Pistons if they got anywhere. How long did it take the Clippers turn things around? People cite the Thunder, but how long did they suck as the SuperSonics before that?